Abstract. This paper deals with the stability properties of an economy where the Central Bank is concerned with stock market developments. We introduce a Taylor rule reacting to stock price growth rates along with in ‡ation and output gap in a New-Keynesian setup. We explore the performance of this rule from the vantage of equilibrium uniqueness. We show that this reaction function can be mapped into a rule with an interest rate smoothing term, whose magnitude increases in the degree of aggressiveness towards asset prices growth. As shown by Bullard and Mitra (2007) this feature of monetary policy inertia can help at alleviating problems of indeterminacy.
Introduction
The increasingly frequent episodes of …nancial turmoil in the last two decades have drawn considerable attention on stock markets developments and on their interdependencies with the real economy. Both policy makers and researchers have debated around the opportunity to design policies capable to a¤ect stock price dynamics in order to improve the macroeconomic performance of both industrialized economies and emerging markets. At the same time, since the seminal work by Taylor (1993) it has become common practice to think about monetary policy in terms of interest rate rules whereby the monetary authority controls the nominal rate of interest in response to in ‡ation and output deviations from their equilibrium level. These parallel developments have stimulated a long-standing debate on the role and scope of Central Banks to implement interest rate rules where the policy instrument responds to asset prices deviations from their equilibrium level, along with reacting to changes in economic conditions. Bullard and Schaling (2002) show that responding to equity prices misalignments from their equilibrium level does not improve the economic performance, and might possibly harm real and …nancial stability. Including equity prices misalignments into a Taylor-type policy rule potentially introduces a root of indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium. Our study builds on this framework.
We show that an explicit response to stock price growth rates translates into a policy rule featuring an interest rate smoothing term 1 whose magnitude increases in the degree of aggressiveness towards asset prices growth. Thus the Central Bank will smooth out changes in the nominal interest rate in response to changes in economic conditions. Conversely, the structural response coe¢ cients to output gap and in ‡ation are weakened by an increase in the response to stock prices growth. As shown by Woodford (2003) and Bullard and Mitra (2007) , monetary policy inertia can help at alleviating problems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly-studied monetary policy rules. Our results suggest that the reaction parameters in the inertial rule can be obtained through the 1 Inertia is a well-documented feature of central bank behavior in industrialized countries. Rudebusch (1995 Rudebusch ( , 2006 provides insightful statistical analysis of this fact.
re-parameterization of an original rule where the Central Bank responds to equity rates of return. In turn, this could indeed re ‡ect an interest in stock market developments from the policy maker's perspective. Also Rudebusch (2006) suggests that policy gradualism could re ‡ect some desire on the part of the Central Bank to reduce the volatility in interest rates and, more generally, in asset prices.
Should the monetary authority respond to asset prices to enhance …nancial stability and rule out possible non-fundamental movements in the stock market? This question has been addressed by a number of contributions. A consensus has not been reached so far. Gertler (1999, 2001 ) design a framework where …nancial frictions give rise to a …nancial accelerator mechanism that magni…es the e¤ects of both exogenous and policy shocks. In their framework a shock to asset prices increases aggregate demand, hence driving up the price level. They conclude that there is no need for a direct response to asset prices, as a Central Bank that responds to general price in ‡ation is implicitly responding to asset price movements. They argue in favor of a monetary policy that does not respond to asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected in ‡ation. Conversely, Genberg et al. (2000) follow the modelling strategy of Gertler (1999, 2001) , and argue that Central Banks should respond to asset prices to stabilize the economy and to prevent from the rise of bubbles.
2 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) reacting to the stock-price growth can achieve substantial stability gains. These …ndings are in line with the analytical results presented in this paper. Pfajfar and Santoro (2008) show that when cost side e¤ects are at work responding to asset price deviations from their frictionless level might be bene…cial from the vantage of equilibrium determinacy. This result is intimately linked to the presence of nominal stickiness and the way this re ‡ects into the relationship between …rms'pro…tability and output gap.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 1 introduces the theoretical setting proposed by Bullard and Schaling (2002) , while Section 2 explores the conditions for equilibrium uniqueness under a rule responding to stock prices growth; last section concludes.
Model
Bullard and Schaling (2002) develop their analysis on the framework put forward by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) . They consider an economy characterized by a continuum of in…nitely-lived agents that derive utility from consumption and incur disutility from production. Each household produces a single di¤erentiated good, but consumes a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle of the goods produced in the economy. Output is sold at a utility-maximizing price under the constraint that only a fraction of the goods prices may be changed in any given period and that other prices must be left at their value in the previous period. This introduces price stickiness. The solution of the households'problem, suitably linearized and simpli…ed as in Woodford (1999) , produces equations (1) and (2) below which describe the dynamics of output and in ‡ation in the economy. The …rst equation is given by:
where x t denotes output gap, t is the in ‡ation rate, i t is the the nominal (risk free) interest rate, i n t is a shock term that follows an AR(1) process.
In ‡ation is determined by:
where relates to the degree of price stickiness and denotes the traditional discount factor.
1.1. Equity Prices. In the Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) framework, as in many dynamic stochastic general equilibrium frameworks, arbitrage relationships can be used to price any asset that might be held by households, provided that …nancial markets are complete.
This means that a …nancial claim on a random nominal quantity
at time t, where t;T is the stochastic discount factor:
where U 0 (C t ) is the marginal utility derived from consumption at time t. The gross nominal interest rate on a nominal one-period bond is then given by:
as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) . In Section 1.3 we relax this assumption and consider a …nancial asset whose payo¤ is related to …rms'pro…tability. This allows us pursue some robustness check on the analytical results detailed in the present section.
Since the stochastic discount factor prices all assets in this model, let us denote the price of a share of aggregate equity by Q t and note that Q t = 1=R t . As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) , the short-term nominal interest rate is de…ned as i t = ln R t : Therefore, as ln R t = ln Q t ; we conclude that:
where q t = ln Q t . Bank to react to contemporaneous or expected future data on output gap and in ‡ation. The interest on this rule over other alternatives derives from the consideration that it requires information that is plausibly in possess of the Central Bank. However, the nature of the Taylor-type rule is not crucial for the results reported in this paper.
We also assume that policy makers wish to include an explicit response to the stock price growth rate q t (= q t q t 1 ). Conversely, Bullard and Schaling (2002) assume a monetary authority responding to percentage deviations of the general level of equity prices from the long-run equilibrium level (q t q ).
The form of the policy rule we wish to study is therefore:
with q > 0. Given (3), this rule can be re-parameterized as:
Thus, the resulting rule features a smoothing term. In particular, the policy instrument is set as a convex combination between the lagged rate of interest and a component re ‡ecting the original response to lagged output gap and in ‡ation. This rule is similar to the one explored by Bullard and Mitra (2007) . Notice that, in case the Central Bank responded to a term (q t q ), we would obtain an instrumental rule similar to the one explored by Bullard and Schaling (2002) :
In this case, the overall response to in ‡ation and output is weakened by the response to asset price gap q . As the response to equity prices misalignments increases, it tends to drive the coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and output gap to zero. Bullard and Schaling (2002) report some results from Bullard and Mitra (2002) to discuss this implication and show that, as q ! 1, indeterminacy is inevitable.
When we implement the policy rule (4), the response to in ‡ation and output is still weakened, but the monetary authority attaches higher importance to the smoothing term:
This feature of rule (4) turns out to be crucial to the results reported in the remainder of the paper. Bullard and Mitra (2007) study the e¤ect of policy inertia on the conditions for equilibrium uniqueness. They consider a rule similar to (4):
where i ; ; x are generic non-negative parameters. In order to transpose their analysis to our case, we can re-write the system under its state-space representation:
3 It is worth pointing out that Bullard and Schaling (2002) 
Condition (6) is precisely what Woodford (2001 Woodford ( , 2003 refers to as the Taylor principle, whereby in the event of a permanent one percent rise in in ‡ation, the cumulative increase in the nominal interest rate is more than one percent. However, the Taylor principle is not generally su¢ cient for determinacy, as another necessary condition is represented by (7).
This proves the following result:
Proposition 1. Bullard and Mitra (2007) .
Assume that ( + i 1) + (1 ) x > 0 for the inertial lagged data interest rule (5). Then a necessary condition for determinacy is:
Proof. See Bullard and Mitra (2007) , Appendix A.
This proposition shows that the Taylor principle is no longer su¢ cient to guarantee determinacy, since it is also necessary that the degree of inertia i be large enough. If the Central Bank merely responds aggressively to in ‡ation and output without a su¢ cient degree of inertia, then the condition for determinacy may be violated. Bullard and Mitra (2007) also show that a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions required for determinacy reduce to (6), (7) and:
The right hand expression in (8) is less than 1 since > 0, > 0, and 0 < < 1. These conditions show that a large enough value of i always results in determinacy since this contributes to satisfy conditions (6), (7), and (8). A value of i 1 always ful…lls (6) and (8), so that if i also satis…es condition (7), then conditions for determinacy are met. Bullard and Mitra (2007) show that the analytical results given above provide intuition for a number of results obtained in more complicated models, such as those explored by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) . These studies generally con…rm that large values of i tend to be associated with a unique equilibrium, provided that other conditions on the structural parameters are satis…ed.
Let us now transpose this analysis to our context. In terms of our parameterization, the conditions above can be expressed as:
Again, the …rst condition corresponds to the Taylor principle. The introduction of an explicit response to asset rates of return only a¤ects the second condition. Thus, we can reformulate the proposition above as follows:
Proposition 2. Assume that ( 1)+(1 ) x > 0 for the inertial lagged data interest rule (4). Then a necessary condition for determinacy is:
It is clear that the left hand expression in (10) increases in q . Therefore, provided that the Taylor principle holds, an increase in the degree of responsiveness to asset rates of return will relax the constraint. Moreover, in order to account for the full set of su¢ cient and necessary conditions for determinacy, according to Woodford (2003) and Bullard and Mitra (2007) , the following constraint should be added to (9) and (10):
where
Thus, we show that i = q = 1 q can be obtained from a Taylor rule where the monetary authority responds to stock price growth rates along with reacting to lagged in‡ation and output gap. In turn, this rule can be mapped into an instrumental rule with policy inertia. These results suggest that the reaction parameters in the inertial rule could indeed re ‡ect an interest in stock market developments from the policy maker's perspective. This is in line with the arguments explored by Rudebusch (2006) , where it is suggested that an obvious rationale for policy gradualism would be some desire on the part of the Central Bank to reduce the volatility in interest rates and, more generally, in asset prices.
1.3. Robustness. So far we have considered …nancial assets consistent with the noarbitrage condition Q t = E t [ t;T X T ] and with two relevant hypotheses: (i) maturity of one period (so that the relevant stochastic discount factor is t;T = t;t+1 ); (ii) a non-stochastic, unitary payo¤ at maturity, i.e. X T = 1. Both assumptions, however, might appear unreasonable for equity claims, which are commonly regarded as long-term assets with payo¤s at maturity that depend on stochastic future dividends, whose value is not independent from the stochastic discount rate. To characterize the implications for equilibrium determinacy of responding to stock prices, the latter need to be di¤erentiated with respect to riskless assets, and linked to real activity. The most natural avenue to pursue this objective in our small-scale model is to link the payo¤ of the equity claim to the stream of dividends paid by monopolistically competitive …rms. As remarked in the introduction, the implications of this modeling assumption have been explored by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) in a simple setup in which the real e¤ects of stock-price movements are channeled by the (potential) response of the Central Bank. We show how the policy implications derived so far are robust to this additional feature of the model.
We start by replacing (3) with a linear stock price equation analogous to that derived in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) :
where d t = #x t denotes dividend payments, # = 1 ( 1) ( + ), denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods, while is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
Equation (12) implies that share prices depend upon the discounted stream of all future dividends. The model can be alternatively closed by the following rules:
According to (13) and (14), the monetary authority responds to current in ‡ation and either to stock price misalignments or to the rate of growth of stock price misalignments. The …rst option is explored in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) . Retrieving analytical conditions for the resulting system loses much of the usual appeal in terms of the power to draw clear conclusions. We …nd more intuitive to plot the region of determinacy through a numerical simulation of the model over a parameter sub-space for the coe¢ cients in the policy rules (13) and (14).
Notice that # implies a negative relationship between dividends and output gap, for a wide range of plausible parameterizations. Price stickiness is crucial to this result. A well known result in the literature is that, as the real marginal cost is proportional to the output gap, an interest rate rule that features a positive response to (expected or current) stock price deviations from their frictionless level is a rule that responds positively to …rms'pro…tability.
This amounts to say that the Central Bank responds negatively to the underlying distortion in the system, the real marginal cost. This is clearly re ‡ected in the left panel of Figure   1 , where the shaded area denotes the space of indeterminacy. As expected, the possibility to induce multiple equilibria increases in q . By contrast, when the Central Bank responds to the stock price growth rate, the general pattern is reversed. Provided that the Taylor principle holds, an increase in the degree of responsiveness to asset rates of return relaxes the constraint and expands the area associated to equilibrium uniqueness. The analytical results retrieved for a risk-free one-period bond are con…rmed even after we take into account the implications of relating stock price dynamics to …rms' pro…tability. We conclude that responding to the rate of growth of stock prices induces a certain degree of monetary policy inertia that exerts a bene…cial impact from the vantage of equilibrium uniqueness under rational expectations. This result seems to be robust to various assumptions about the underlying process describing the dynamics of asset prices.
Concluding Remarks
In the last decade a number of contributions have explored the role and the scope of monetary authorities in acting to enhance …nancial stability along with ensuring price stability. The general wisdom is that including equity prices misalignments from their equilibrium level into a Taylor rule does not improve the economic performance, and might possibly harm both real and …nancial stability, by introducing a root of indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium.
In this note we show that an explicit response to stock price growth rates translates into a policy rule featuring an interest rate smoothing term. In this case the response coe¢ cient to the lagged rate of interest increases in the degree of aggressiveness towards rates of return on equity. Conversely, the structural response coe¢ cients to output gap and in ‡ation are weakened by an increase in the response to stock prices growth. Therefore, as the Central Bank attaches higher importance to stock price dynamics, it will smooth out changes in the nominal rate of interest. This results suggest that the reaction parameters in inertial rules could indeed re ‡ect an interest in stock market developments from the policy maker's perspective. As shown by Bullard and Mitra (2007) , an increased degree of interest rate smoothing may help at alleviating problems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly-studied monetary policy rules.
